Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 15

2004

Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools
Wendy Thai

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Wendy Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 373 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol6/iss1/15

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

THAI_N1

12/29/2004 1:59:08 PM

Note
Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research
Tools
Wendy Thai*
INTRODUCTION
The scope and propriety of the experimental use exemption
to patent infringement liability have become a controversial
topic among both the legal and scientific community. Although
the common law exemption has existed for almost 200 years, its
applicability to academic research remained untested until
Madey v. Duke University.1 In Madey, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit rejected a categorical exemption for
university research activities, holding that the experimental
use exemption is not applicable if the alleged infringing act
furthers the university’s legitimate business and is not solely
“for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry.”2 This decision was a rude awakening
for the scientific community, which, for more than two decades,
had assumed immunity from patent infringement liability
under this common law exemption.3 In the only patent
infringement case involving a university, the court had held
that the defendant was not liable for contributory infringement
as the use of infringing machines by a university was
experimental and thus, did not amount to infringement.4 Even
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. This work
was supported by the University of Minnesota’s Consortium on Law and
Values in Health, Environment & the Life Sciences.
1. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
2. Id. at 1362.
3. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE
1018 (2003); see also S. Peter Ludwig & Jason C. Chumney, No Room for
Experiment: the Federal Circuit’s Narrow Construction of the Experimental
Use Defense, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 453 (2003).
4.. Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935), rev’d
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as late as 1985, “[f]ew would deny the experimental use
exception for research on patented technology performed at a
university in furtherance of its educational function.”5 Yet
today, in light of the increasing presence of universities in the
intellectual property arena, many would deny just that. Madey
v. Duke University and the surrounding controversy is a case in
point.
The Madey case stemmed from a dispute between John
Madey, inventor of the first free electron laser (FEL), and Duke
University over management of the FEL research laboratory at
Duke and access to equipments incorporating the FEL
technology.6 When negotiations over control of the laboratory
reached an impasse, John Madey resigned from the faculty at
Duke and later brought patent infringement charges for
continued exploitation of the FEL technology without his
consent.7 Duke asserted the common law experimental use
exemption in its defense, but this was ultimately rejected by
the Federal Circuit on the ground that university research,
though arguably having no commercial application, furthers
the legitimate business objectives of universities and thus does
not qualify for the “very narrow and strictly limited”
experimental use exemption.8
Although it is difficult to justify a different outcome under
the particular facts of Madey,9 the “narrow and strictly limited”
exemption set forth by the Federal Circuit has been met with
much controversy.
The Madey court makes clear that
universities wanting to avoid the risk of incurring patent
infringement liability must, like everyone else, obtain the
consent of patent holders prior to using patented technologies
in their research.
Critics characterized the decision as
“disastrous,”10 and one that “transforms the academic science
on other grounds, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936).
5. Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 633 (1985).
6. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352-53; see also Eliot Marshall, Physicist Sues
Duke Over Control of Lab, 278 SCIENCE 1393 (1997).
7. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352-53.
8. Id. at 1362-63.
9. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 85 (2004) (discussing the facts
of the Madey case and stating that “a judicial exemption of such research as
noncommercial experimental use would have gutted the core grant of
exclusivity supposedly provided by the patent”).
10. David Malakoff, Universities Ask Supreme Court to Reverse Patent
Ruling, 299 SCIENCE 26, 27 (2003) (quoting Sheldon Steinbach, general
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landscape in a horribly perverse way.”11 On the other hand,
supporters contend that it serves to affirm the rights of the
patent holder and is consistent with precedent and the
underlying premise of patent law to promote scientific
progress.12 They view the decision as one that will hold
universities accountable for their commercial activities.13 The
modern university, with its technology transfer office, patent
portfolios, and corporate-sponsored research projects, is
increasingly taking on the role of a market participant and
shedding its traditional role as a disinterested steward of
Viewed in this context, Madey undeniably
knowledge.14
appeals to one’s sense of justice and fair play.
In practice, however, and particularly as applied to
biotechnology and biomedical research, a narrow and strictly
limited exemption confers little practical benefit to patent
holders at the expense of imposing detrimental obstacles to
university research. Patent law places the responsibility of
enforcing patents on patent holders, but detecting infringement
in university research activity can be a challenge for patent
holders who have no effective means to police the use of
technologies in university laboratories.15 Even when infringing
activity is known, patent holders have tended to be reluctant to
counsel of the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C.).
11. Id. at 26 (quoting David Korn of the Association of American Medical
Colleges in Washington, D.C.).
12. See Theodore B. Olson et al., Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S 958 (2003), reprinted in 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 511, 515
[hereinafter Brief] (“When the public is permitted to engage in the unlicensed
use of patented inventions without incurring liability for infringement, even
with respect to ‘experimental’ uses that may offer other scientific benefits, the
incentives provided by the patent laws are diminished and the nature of the
patent ‘bargain’ altered.”).
13. See, e.g., David B. Resnik, Patents and the Research Exemption, 299
SCIENCE 821 (2003).
14. Id. at 821; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1018-19; Ludwig & Chumney,
supra note 3, at 453.
15. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property Right, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2657-58 (1994) (discussing the
application of the Coase Theorem to inventor/infringer interactions and
stating that in the intellectual property rights context, “there is no smoky soot
or wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker” of infringement); see
also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1071-72 (1989)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science] (“Making and
using a patented invention within a research laboratory is not very
conspicuous and may never come to the attention of the patent holder.”).
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enforce their patents against universities as the prospective
gains do not justify the risk of having their patents invalidated
or the scope of their patents narrowed in an infringement
suit.16 To the extent that this is true, a narrow experimental
use exemption may have little impact on the patent holder’s
decision to assert her patent against university infringers, and
thus confers little tangible benefits. For university researchers,
on the other hand, the impact is less benign. Recent judicial
and federal patent policies have led to a proliferation of patents
in the biomedical field that increasingly cover upstream
technologies used as tools of laboratory research.17 In response,
university researchers have adopted working solutions,
including outright patent infringement, to circumvent the delay
and high transaction costs associated with obtaining access to
patented technologies.18 But patent infringement is a risky
working solution in a post-Madey era. Without the law on their
side, the fates of universities are at the discretion and good
grace of patent holders whose interests are increasingly
antithetical to that of universities. In sum, the current law
confers little tangible benefits to patent holders, while placing
university researchers between the Charybdis of uncertainty in
relying on the forbearance of patent holders and the Scylla of
bearing the costs and delays associated with having to obtain
licenses ex ante.
This article sets out a method for facilitating access to
patented research tools so as to maximize the benefit to patent
holders and university researchers alike. The method includes
a self-reporting mechanism by which a university user discloses
the use of patented research tools when a patent application is
filed covering the results of that research. This disclosure
requirement serves to notify patent holders that their patented
technologies have been used, and by requiring disclosure at the
time a patent application is filed, universities are held
accountable, as are other market participants, for their
commercial activities.
The method also includes a
predetermined research fee associated with each research tool
16. John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299
SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (stating “small prospective gains from a lawsuit were not
worth the legal fees, the risk of the patent being narrowed or invalidated, and
the bad publicity from suing a university”).
17. See id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998).
18. Walsh et al., supra note 16.
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patent to be applied to university users. This research fee
allows the patent holder to name her price while serving to
notify a prospective university user of the cost of a selected
research tool, thus protecting university from disgorging. In
essence, the proposed model functions as a shortcut to facilitate
access to patented research tools and thereby promotes
efficiency in research by circumventing the need to obtain
consent ex ante.
The first part of this paper will be a discussion of the
relevant aspects of U.S. patent laws. This is followed by a brief
description of the patent environment in biotechnology and the
issues related to gaining access to patented research tools.
Next, the paper will include a discussion of the distinction
between liability and property rules, as well as compulsory
licensing models that have been proposed in the legal
literature. Finally, this article will describe a possible solution
that involves adoption of a self-disclosure requirement and a
predetermined research fee for use of patented research tools
by university researchers.
I. PATENT AND PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWS
GENERALLY
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to
promote the “Progress of Science” by giving “Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”19 Thus, federal patent
law gives the holder of a patent the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale or selling the patented
technology.20 The right to exclude is not a natural right but
rather one conferred by law and given only if statutory
requirements are met. To be patentable, an invention must be
of a statutorily prescribed subject matter;21 it must also meet
the statutory requirements of utility,22 novelty,23 and nonobviousness.24 To obtain a patent, the inventor must timely file
a patent application25 that adequately discloses and claims the
invention to be patented.26 An adequate disclosure is one that
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
Id. § 101.
Id. § 112.
Id. § 102.
Id. § 103.
Id. § 102.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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describes the invention in sufficient detail so as to enable a
person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to make
and to use the invention.27 In addition, the inventor also
discloses in the patent specification what she believes to be the
relevant field of art, the state of that art, and existing problems
that the invention addresses.28 During the patent procurement
process, the inventor and all involved are bound by a duty of
candor and good faith that requires disclosure of information
material to patentability.29 The duty of candor and good faith
can be met by submitting an information disclosure statement
that includes a list of patents, publications, applications or
other information.30
Once a patent is issued, the patent holder bears the
responsibility for enforcing her patent. Since a patent gives the
holder the right to exclude others from practicing the invention,
anyone who makes, uses, or sells a patented invention without
the patent holder’s consent infringes the patent.31 In response,
the patent holder can bring a civil patent infringement suit.32
The remedies available to the patent holder include an
injunction to prevent further infringement33 and damages as
compensation for past infringement.34
II. PATENT INFRINGEMENT DEFENSES
A patent holder’s right to recover from what otherwise
would be infringing activity is not absolute. Although a patent
carries a presumption of validity, an accused infringer can
challenge its validity by showing a failure to satisfy the
patentability requirements.
A showing that the patent
disclosure is not enabling, for example, would render the patent
invalid and thus unenforceable.35 In addition, a showing that
27. Id.
28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2001); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(a), (c) (8th
ed. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
29. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2001).
30. Id. §§ 1.56, 1.97-.98.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
32. Id. § 281.
33. Id. § 283.
34. Id. § 284.
35. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that a claim to nucleic acid sequences that encode erythropoietin and
other polypeptides having the same biological activity invalid and
unenforceable on the ground that the specification did not enable one skilled
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the patent holder had violated the duty of candor and good
faith during the patent procurement process by intentionally
engaging in fraud or inequitable conduct such as intentionally
submitting false or misleading information, or misrepresenting
or failing to disclose information that was material to
patentability, would render the patent unenforceable under the
equitable principle of unclean hands.36
A patent holder’s right to recovery has also been limited by
the common law experimental use exemption initially
formulated in 1813. The common law exemption is presumed
to be incorporated into the definition of infringement provided
by section 271(a) of the 1952 Patent Act.37 The experimental
use exemption doctrine originated from Justice Joseph Story’s
opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter.38 In Whittemore, Cutter was
sued for infringement of a patent on a machine for making
cotton and wool cards.39 Having lost the suit, Cutter moved for
a new trial on various grounds, one of which was an objection to
the court’s statement “that the making of a machine fit for use,
and with a design to use it for profit, was an infringement of
the patent right, for which an action was given by the
statute.”40 In response, Justice Story affirmed the trial judge’s
charge stating: “it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine
merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its
described effects.”41 In a subsequent case, Justice Story stated
“the making of a patented machine to be an offence . . . must be
the making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the
mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the
verity and exactness of the specification.”42
in the art to make and use a representative number of the claimed sequences).
36. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp. and Toshiba Am.
Elec. Components, Inc., 231 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm
Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1048 (Fed.Cir.1995); Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993).
37. See Brief, supra note 12, at 515 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961)).
38. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (1813) (No. 17,600).
39. Id. at 1121.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (1813) (No. 12,391).
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Early common law recognized the applicability of the
exemption to the use of a patented technology “for the sole
purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for
mere amusement . . . .”43 More recent cases that further
delineate the boundaries of the exemption indicate that uses
that are “in keeping with the legitimate business” of the alleged
infringer do not qualify for the exemption.44 In these cases, the
court found that either (1) there was no evidence that the
alleged infringing activity was solely for experimental
purposes; or (2) the alleged infringing activity had commercial
purposes.
In Pitcairn v. United States,45 for example, the government
was required to compensate the inventor for use of helicopters
incorporating patented rotor structures and control systems
that were manufactured without a license even though the use
was “for testing, evaluational, demonstrational or experimental
purposes.”46 In this case, there was no evidence that the use
was “solely for experimental purposes.”47 Experimental use
was not a defense because “experiments of such nature are
intended uses of the infringing aircraft . . . and are in keeping
with the legitimate business of the using agency.”48
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc,49
the Federal Circuit held that Bolar was liable for patent
infringement when it used a patented drug owned by Roche in
a bioequivalency test necessary to obtain U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval for a generic version of the
patented drug.50 Bolar argued that its tests using a patented
drug “are ‘true scientific inquiries’ to which a literal
interpretation of the experimental use exception logically
The Federal Circuit rejected this
should extend.”51
construction of the exemption, holding that the exemption was
“truly narrow,” and a broad construction, according to the
court, would “allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of
43. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (1861) (No. 11,279).
44. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Roche Prod.,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Embrex v. Service
Eng’g Corp. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
45. 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
46. Id. at 1125.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1125-26.
49. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 863.
51. Id.
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‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable,
“Bolar’s
and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”52
intended ‘experimental’ use [was] solely for business reasons
and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry.”53 Relying on precedent, the Federal
Circuit stated that “‘experiments . . . in keeping with the
legitimate business of the . . . [alleged infringer]’ are
infringements for which ‘[e]xperimental use is not a defense.’”54
Similarly, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp,55 a
failed experiment conducted to design around the claims of a
Service
patent was deemed to be an infringing use.56
Engineering Corporation (SEC) had retained two researchers to
“investigate the possibility of injecting chicken embryos outside
the region covered by the . . . patent claims,” but the
researchers failed, and the “tests showed that . . . most
injections penetrated [into the] areas covered by the . . .
patent.” 57 The Federal Circuit rejected SEC’s argument that
these experiments were protected by the experimental use
exemption as the exemption was narrowly construed.58 Thus,
SEC was liable for patent infringement since the experiments
were conducted “expressly for commercial purposes.”59
Madey v. Duke University60 was the first case in which the
applicability of the experimental use exemption to university
research activities was challenged. In Madey, the Federal
Circuit stated that the exemption would not apply if the alleged
infringing use was in keeping with the university’s legitimate
business and was not “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”61 With respect
to the “legitimate business” prong of the analysis, the court
stated that research projects, arguably having no commercial
applications, nonetheless further a university’s legitimate
business objectives, which included “educating and
enlightening students and faculty, . . . increase[ing] the status
52.
53.
54.
1976)).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl.
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1362-63.
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of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants,
students, and faculty.”62
In addition to the common exemption, Congress has also
provided a statutory exemption to infringement liability under
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) which codifies a part of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.63 The Hatch-Waxman Act
was a response to lobbying efforts by the generic drug industry
to circumvent the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products.
The generic drug industry argued that because generic drug
manufacturers could not begin bio-equivalency studies with a
patented drug until the patent term expires, the patent holder,
in effect, gained a de facto extension of the drug’s patent term
by the length of time necessary to obtain FDA approval for the
generic drug.64 Thus, section 271(e) provides that uses of
patented drugs solely for purposes reasonably related to
obtaining regulatory approval are exempt from patent
infringement liability.65 Most recently, the Federal Circuit has
held that the exemption in section 271(e) does not encompass
“exploratory research that may rationally form only a predicate
for future FDA clinical tests” such as preclinical drug screening
that would lead to clinical trials and the production of data for
the regulatory approval process.66 Section 271(e) has also been
interpreted, however, to encompass the testing of medical
devices.67
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is thought that
Congress did not intend to preempt the entire common law
experimental use doctrine. Both the legislative history of the
Act and subsequent case law from the Federal Circuit and
lower courts is consistent with this proposition.68 In addition,

62. Id. at 1362.
63. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante
Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2001).
64. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 864. (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
65. Mueller, supra note 63, at 25.
66. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
67. Mueller, supra note 63, at 12. See Intermedics Inc. v. Ventritex Co.
775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
68. Mueller, supra note 63, at 26-32.
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there is evidence to support the proposition that in creating a
category of activity that is exempted from infringement liability
under section 271(e), Congress did not intend to preclude other
types of experimental use from liability exemption.69 The
introduction of House Report (H.R.) 4970, the “Transgenic
Animal Patent Reform Act,” by Representative Kastenmeier in
1988, has been cited in support of this proposition.70 This bill
would have exempted from patent infringement the breeding,
use and selling of transgenic animals by farmers.71 Although
the bill passed the House in September 13, 1988, no further
action was taken after it was referred to a Senate committee.72
A more recent example is H.R. 3967, the Genomic Research and
Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, introduced by
Representative Lynn Rivers of Michigan.73 This bill would
have exempted from patent infringement researchers who use
patented genetic sequence information for noncommercial
research purposes; it was analogous to the “fair use” doctrine in
copyright law that “permits socially valuable uses without a
license.”74 No further action was taken after H.R. 3967 was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee.75
III. PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
Patent laws as applied to discoveries in biotechnology have
experienced significant developments in the last twenty-five
years in response to rapid scientific advances. Recombinant
DNA methodology, for example, was developed in 1973.76 The
technology allowed foreign genes to be introduced into a
selected host organism, thus enabling the creation of
genetically engineered organisms with new and useful traits.
One such organism is a bacterium engineered by Ananda M.
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. Id. at 27 n.132.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.R. 3967, 106th Cong. (2002) at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03967:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
74. See OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY & ANALYSIS, Legislative Updates,
107th Congress, Gene Patenting, H.R. 3966 and H.R. 3967, at
http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/107/pendinglegislation/9gene.asp (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004).
75. Id.
76. BERNARD R. GLICK & JACK J. PASTERNAK, MOLECULAR
BIOTECHNOLOGY, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS OF RECOMBINANT DNA 6 (2d
ed. 1998).
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Chakrabarty to break down components of crude oil.77 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected
Mr. Chakrabarty’s application for patent on the engineered
bacterium on the ground that living things were a product of
nature and thus could not be patented.78 The Supreme Court,
however, upheld the patentability of the organism stating that
anything made by man, whether living or otherwise, was
patentable.79
Development of DNA sequencing technology also led to
significant developments in patent law.
Techniques for
determining the sequence of DNA were first developed in 1976,
and the first commercial automated DNA synthesizer was sold
in 1981.80 Continued advances in DNA sequencing technology
resulted in determination of the genomic sequences of diverse
organisms such as mosquito, mouse, rice, and human, 81 which
in turn spurred the patenting of nucleic acids such as DNA
molecules. Although the patenting of DNA molecules has also
been controversial, Federal Circuit treatment of nucleic acid
patents has, arguably, facilitated their patentability. For
example, to satisfy the written description requirement of
section 112 as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, claims
covering nucleic acids must be supported by a description in the
patent specification of the nucleic acid’s “structure, formula,
chemical name or physical properties.”82 A disclosure in the
specification of the sequence of a polypeptide and a method for
isolating nucleic acids that encode these polypeptides were
deemed insufficient to satisfy the written description
Even though knowledge of a polypeptide
requirement.83
sequence is sufficient to isolate the corresponding nucleic acid
using routine methodologies, such knowledge alone is
insufficient for the experimenter to predict the exact nucleic
77. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
78. Id. at 306.
79. Id. at 310, 313.
80. GLICK & PASTERNAK, supra note 76.
81. See generally National Center for Biotechnology Information, Genome
Resources, at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Genomes/index.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004).
82. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology
Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1174-77 (2002) (discussing the
Federal Circuit’s invalidation of nucleic acid claims in Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119
F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
83. Id.
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acid that would be obtained.84 Similarly, public knowledge of a
polypeptide sequence and methodology for isolating the
corresponding nucleic acid does not render obvious a claim to a
particular nucleic acid that encodes the polypeptide of
The combined effect of the Federal Circuit’s
interest.85
application of the written description and non-obviousness
requirements to claims covering nucleic acids has been
postulated to lead to a large number of DNA patents, though
with narrow coverage.86
Advances in biotechnology and the corresponding
developments in patent law have led to a proliferation of
patents covering biotechnology discoveries.87 From 1990 to
2000, for example, the number of patents granted by the
USPTO in the field of biotechnology had risen by fifteen
percent annually compared with a five percent rise in all
patents.88 A particular concern with the proliferation of
patents covering biotechnology discoveries is the fact that these
patents cover fundamental research discoveries such as
disease-related genes, functional genetic elements, and
transgenic animals that are necessary for further downstream
Such upstream patents impede downstream
research.89
research and development when patent holders restrict the
availability of patented research tools, demand excessive
licensing fees, or impose restrictive licensing terms.90 Another
facet of the problem has been described as the “tragedy of the
anticommons” in which the fragmentation of intellectual
property rights in an innovation creates a situation in which it
is difficult to obtain a complete set of licenses for research into
the subject area of the innovation.91 To illustrate, in a
84. See id. at 1178-79 for a more extensive discussion of the biological
relationship between polypeptides and nucleic acids.
85. Id. at 1177-79 (discussing In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993), In
re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and the Federal Circuit’s application of
the non-obviousness standard).
86. Id. at 1181-82.
87. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 5-6.
88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PATENTS AND INNOVATION:
TRENDS
AND
POLICY
CHALLENGES
22
(2004),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf.
89. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 7-8 (discussing difficulties in gaining
access to patents covering DNA sequences, nucleic acid vectors, and transgenic
mice); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2004).
90. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 7-8.
91. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 699.
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discussion paper on the ethics of DNA patenting, the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics reported that over twenty U.S. patents
were implicated in the development of a malaria vaccine: five
core U.S. patents relate to the MSP-1, a protein produced by
the malaria parasite; a dozen other patents relate to “add-on”
technologies such as nucleic acid sequences useful in
constructing a vaccine; and an additional five relate to the
production of MSP-1 vaccines.92 In these cases, even if the
necessary technologies are available for licensing, the delay and
transaction costs associated with obtaining licenses would
impede downstream research.93 These hurdles are further
exacerbated by the universities’ lack of expertise in handling
multiple licensing transactions.94
Further complicating the issue is the fact that universities
have become active participants in the patent market. In 1980,
to facilitate technology transfer from federally-sponsored
research to the industry, the Bayh-Dole Act95 and the
Stevenson-Wydler Act96 were passed. The Bayh-Dole Act, in
92. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA,
43 (July 20, 2002), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/
patentingdna/publication_310.html; see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note
17, at 699 (noting that there were more than 100 issued U.S. patents in which
the term “adrenergic receptor” is found in the claim).
93. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 700; see also Malakoff, supra
note 10, at 26 (stating that universities believe research would be hindered if
scientists are forced to obtain permission from before using patented
technologies); id. at 27 (quoting Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel of the
American Council on Education as saying that it would be “'disastrous' . . . if
researchers have to stop and conduct expensive, time-consuming patent
searches and make licensing deals every time they want to bring a new
technology or technique into the lab."); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over
the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or Emerging,
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 223, 225
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds, 2001) (stating that there is a widely
shared perception among scientists and university technology transfer
professionals that “negotiations over the transfer of proprietary research tools
present a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in biomedical research
and product development” and further that “[s]cientists report having to wait
months or even years to carry out experiments while their institutions
attempt to renegotiate the terms of ‘Material Transfer Agreements’ . . .
database access agreements, and patent license agreements”).
94. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 700.
95. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (commonly known as the
“Bayh-Dole Act”).
96. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96480, § 2, 94 Stat. 2311-2320 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 37013715 (2000)).
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particular, allowed universities to retain title to federallyfunded research discoveries and required that universities seek
patent protection for federally-funded inventions for which they
elect to retain title.97 As a result, the number of universities
engaged in technology transfer has experienced an eight-fold
increase between 1980 and 2000, accompanied by a
corresponding increase in patenting and licensing activities.98
In addition to their significant patenting and licensing
activities, universities are also placing restrictions on the
dissemination of research materials that may prove
As
commercially valuable in downstream research.99
universities become increasingly significant participants in the
intellectual property market, it becomes more difficult to justify
a research exemption even in light of the burdensome
transaction costs associated with gaining access to patents
covering upstream technologies. Michelle Walters, for example,
has argued that when an invention is patented and the
university derives monetary benefits, then the experimental
use exemption may be inapplicable.100 The Madey court cited
Duke University’s “aggressive patent licensing program” to
support rejection of a categorical experimental use exemption
for university research activity.101
IV. PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES
Numerous proposals have been made to modify the
97. See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS (1999), at
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/bayh.html.
98. Assoc. of Univ. Tech. Managers, Surveys – Bayh-Dole Act (2000), at
http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/facts.html (reporting that (1) fewer than 250
U.S. patents were issued to universities annually prior to the Bayh-Dole Act,
while more than 2,000 patents were issued annually to universities in the late
1990’s, and (2) a 133 % increases in licenses between 1991 and 1999); cf. Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 291-92 (noting that the number of patents issued
to universities annually had increased from 264 in 1979 to 2,436 in 1997
compared to the two-fold increase in all patents); Assoc. of Univ. Tech.
Managers, Surveys – Common Questions & Answers About Technology
Transfer (2000), at http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/qa.html (reporting that
3,914 new licenses agreements were signed by universities in 1999, a 129 %
increase from 1991).
99. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 291.
100. Michelle Walters, De Minimis Use and Experimental Use Exceptions to
Patent Infringement: A Comment on the Embrex Concurrence, 29 AIPLA Q. J.
509, 537 (2001).
101. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63, n.7 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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experimental use exemption to address the concern that
patents on upstream discoveries would hinder downstream
research.102 Many of these advocate the adoption of a liability
rule approach to facilitate access to patented research tools.103
The United States patent system implements a property rule
by recognizing in the patent holder a right to exclude others
from her property.104 The patent holder is empowered with the
right to seek damages for past infringement as well as the right
to injunctive relief to prevent future infringement.105 Under a
liability-rule system, however, a patent holder is entitled to be
compensated for encroachment on her property in lieu of the
right to exclude.106 In addition, the amount of compensation is
objectively determined by the state rather than by the parties
involved.107 A property rule is the method of choice in the
context in which transaction costs associated with allocating
property rights between the property owner and others are low
relative to the costs related to determining damages and
In
compensation after encroachment has taken place.108
contrast, a liability rule is useful when the transaction costs of
bargaining are high.109
Liability rules tend to be the exception applied when the
public interest in broader access to a patented invention is
deemed to be more important than the private interest of the

102. See e.g., Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, supra note 15;
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems
with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163 [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patenting
Research Tools]; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Mueller, supra note 63;
Strandburg, supra note 9; David C. Hoffman, A Modest Proposal: Toward
Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (2004).
103. See e.g., Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science, supra note 15;
Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools, supra note 102; Mueller, supra note 63;
Hoffman, supra note 102.
104. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1971).
105. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2000).
106. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 104, at 1092.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1106 (stating “[o]ften the cost of establishing the value of an
initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the
entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur” as
justification for the need for liability rules).
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patent holder.110 In these cases, the patent holder is “forced to
tolerate, against his will, the exploitation of his invention” by
another.111 This hostility towards the rights of patent holders
contributes, in part, to the unpopularity of liability rule-based
approaches such as compulsory licensing in the United
States.112
An additional argument against a liability-rule approach in
general emphasizes the difficulty in implementation, since
there are no effective methods of detection and valuation.113
The difficulty in detecting infringement stems from the
abstract nature of intellectual property. In contrast to “[a]
farmer adjacent to a cattle ranch [who] will normally have no
trouble determining when cattle have trampled her crops,” in
the intellectual property context, “there is no smoky soot or
wandering cattle to serve as an unambiguous marker . . . .
Creators very often work far away from each other, and at
Particularly illustrative are patented
different times.”114
research tools. “[R]esearch tool[s],” as defined by the National
Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools,
encompass “the full range of resources that scientists use in the
laboratory” and include “cell lines, monoclonal antibodies,
reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial
chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning
tools . . . .”115 When the use of research tools is not disclosed in
some way, for example, when the tool is not incorporated into
the final product or the use is not disclosed as part of a
publication or patent specification, it can be difficult for the
110. JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL
FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA
USA
21
(2003),
at
AND
THE
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/projectoutputs.htm.
111. Id.
112. See Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools, supra note 102, at 174
(stating that if modification of the experimental use exemption to deny patent
holders an injunctive remedy but permitting recovery of a reasonable royalty
as damages is perceived as a compulsory licensing, it “may be opposed
throughout the industry” and then suggesting that an exemption that denies a
damage remedy altogether is preferable because this “would seem less like a
compulsory license provision . . . although ultimately more hostile to the
interests of patent holders”).
113. See Merges, supra note 15, at 2657-60.
114. Id. at 2658.
115. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 11 (quoting NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
HEALTH (NIH), REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS 3
(1998), at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm).
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patent holder to detect that use. With respect to valuation, in a
liability rule-based approach, the difficulty results from the
“abstract quality of the benefits” conferred by intellectual
property and their “cumulative, interdependent nature,” both of
which lead to disagreements as to whether and to what extent
a prior work added to the subsequent one.116 In addition, the
uniqueness of the intellectual property contributes to the
difficulty in determining value by a third party.117 These
difficulties can lead to undervaluation or overvaluation and
result in undercompensation or overcompensation.
In a
property rule-based approach in which the parties are left to
bargain for the value of the exchange, the heterogeneous
interests and cognitive biases of the parties involved become
obstacles in arriving at an agreed value for the exchange.118
Cognitive biases, such as overestimating the likelihood that
one’s own asset among multiple potential options would be the
critical contribution or overvaluing one’s own asset while
undervaluing that of others, postulated to be pervasive among
scientists, could interfere with successful bargaining.119
V. CRAFTING AN EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION –
EXISTING MODELS
Professor Janice Mueller has addressed the above concerns
in her model proposing a liability rule approach for regulating
access to patented research tools.120 In her model, the research
tool user is required to notify the patent holder of the intended
use as well as any products about to be marketed that have
been developed from that use.121 Those failing to provide notice
to the patent holder would be subject to treble damages once
infringement is established.122 The model employs a reachthrough royalty structure to compensate the patent holder for
use of a patented research tool.123 The reach-through royalty
structure links royalty payments to the patent holder with the
commercial value of any products developed from the use of the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Merges, supra note 15, at 2658-59.
Id. at 2664.
See Eisenberg & Heller, supra note 17, at 701.
Id.
Mueller, supra note 63.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
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patented research tool.124 The model applies to research tools
not readily available for licensing on reasonable terms or via
anonymous marketplace purchase.125 The term “research tools”
encompasses tools used in the “development of new
biotechnological or pharmaceutical products that do not
The
themselves physically incorporate the tool.”126
development use model’s focus on commercial products and
royalties determined from sales, profits and production costs
renders it less suitable for the university research tool user if
the “products” developed from that use take the form of
patents. One way to adapt Professor Mueller’s model to the
university setting would be to link royalty payments with
patent licensing revenues rather than sales of marketed
products.
Recently, Professor Katherine Strandburg has proposed
another approach to crafting the experimental use exemption
that relies on the distinction between “experimenting on” and
Professor
“experimenting with” a patented invention.127
Strandburg defined “experimenting on” as “experimentation
aimed at verifying, designing around, or improving upon a
patented invention,”128 while “‘[e]xperimenting with’ is
experimentation in which a patented invention is used . . . as a
research tool.”129 She proposed that “experimenting on” a
patented invention should be broadly permitted without regard
to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the user as the
experiment has little impact on the incentive to invent.130 In
contrast, she proposed a limited exemption for “experimenting
with” a patented research tool in which the patentee is given an
initial period of complete exclusivity followed by a period of
compulsory licensing.131
Noting the difficulty in applying the experimenting on/with
distinction in the biotechnology context, Professor Strandburg
stated that an infringing experimentation falls into the
“experimenting on” category if the infringement could have
been avoided in principle by more information about the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Mueller, supra note 63, at 14.
Strandburg, supra note 9, at 88-89.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 90.
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patented invention.132 Yet this standard is also difficult to
apply. To illustrate, Professor Strandburg applied this test to
the infringing experiments in Integra Lifesciences.133 In this
case, Merck was found liable for patent infringement when its
researchers conducted biochemical experiments using peptides
drug candidates that fell within the generic class of peptides
patented by Integra Lifesciences.134 Applying the above test,
Professor Strandburg concluded that the Integra experiments
fell into the “experimenting on” category for several reasons.
The purpose of the experiments was to learn more about the
new peptides; and if the new peptides were within the scope of
the more generic peptide patented, then experiments using the
new peptides would have been conducted to better understand
the patented invention.135 However, the purpose of the Integra
experiments was to develop new treatment for cancer, diabetic
retinopathy and other conditions,136 rather than to better
understand the nature of these peptides. More specifically, Dr.
David Cheresh, a researcher at Scripps, had discovered a
mechanism for interfering with angiogenesis, and this
discovery was of interest to Merck because inhibiting
angiogenesis is a potential method of halting tumor growth.137
As a result, Merck “hired Scripps and Dr. Cheresh to identify
potential drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis,” and
this led to the discovery of particular peptides that were
ultimately found to infringe Integra’s patents.138 Merck and
Scripps then entered into an agreement to “fund the necessary
experiments ‘to satisfy the biological basis and regulatory
(FDA) requirements for the implementation of clinical trials’
with EMD66203;” this agreement “contemplated commencing
clinical trials with a drug candidate within three years.”139
Thus, Merck’s interest in the peptides stemmed from their
potential usefulness as drugs and Merck’s primary purpose was
to find new treatments for disease conditions. Put another
way, the experimentation found to be infringing was conducted

132. Id. at 148.
133. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 149.
134. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
135. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 149.
136. Integra Lifesciences I, 331 F.3d at 863.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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for the purpose of gaining better understanding of how tumor
growth could be suppressed by inhibitors of angiogenesis, and
the infringing peptides were the necessary tools in this
endeavor. In sum, an experimental use exemption that relies
on an experimenting on/with distinction may be difficult to
apply in the biotechnology context.
VI. A DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT AND A
PREDETERMINED RESEARCH FEE FOR UNIVERSITY
USERS?
This article sets out another approach that will provide
universities with a mechanism for unfettered access to
patented research tools, while at the same time facilitating
recovery by the patent holder for that use. The proposed model
is to be applied when the user of patented technology is a
university researcher. It incorporates the definition of research
tools set out by Professor Janice Mueller.140 Thus, the term
“research tools” refers to all patented tools used in
biotechnology research that do not become physically
incorporated into a product that is ultimately marketed.141 In
addition, only those “research tools” that are not readily
available for licensing on reasonable terms, or not available via
The
anonymous marketplace purchase, are included.142
proposed model is triggered when a university becomes a
participant in the intellectual property market.
Once a
university becomes a market participant, the model imposes a
research tool disclosure requirement on the university user.
The model also requires all patent holders stipulate to a
predetermined research fee to be applied to university users.
The following is a discussion of the various aspects of the
present model and how each addresses the concerns raised
above.
A. THE UNIVERSITY AS A MARKET PARTICIPANT
The proposed model is based on the premise that when a
university participates in the market it should be treated as all
other market participants.143 A university is deemed to be a
per se market participant when it seeks patent protection for its
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Mueller, supra note 63, at 14.
Id.
See id. at 15, 58.
See Walters, supra note 100.
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research. Thus, the university’s obligation to compensate the
patent holder when a research tool has been used in research is
triggered when the university files a patent application
covering the results of that research. The university has no
obligation to compensate the patent holder when the result of
research is dedicated to the public by publication without
patenting.
Thus, in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, unless and until the university files a patent
application, it incurs no liability to the patent holder as the
university is presumed to be acting in the interest of furthering
the public good.
In distinguishing between a university acting in the public
interest and one acting as a market participant, the model
holds a university accountable for its commercial activity
without alleviating any undue delays and costs related to
gaining access to patented research tools. The model also
protects the interests of patent holders, particularly those of
the holders of patents covering research tools. A broad
exemption from infringement liability for university
researchers would undermine the value of research tool patents
as researchers tend to be “ordinary consumers” of such
The current narrow exemption from
technologies.144
infringement liability poses obstacles to research by imposing
burdensome measures to avoid the risk of liability. This
approach strikes a balance between maintaining the incentive
to invent and ensuring that research is not unduly hampered
by patents on research tools.
B. RESEARCH TOOL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
The model adopts a disclosure requirement similar to that
in Professor Mueller’s development use model.145 It differs
from Professor Mueller’s model in that the filing of a patent
application would trigger the present disclosure requirement.
The disclosure requirement would impose a duty on the part of
the university user to disclose the use of a patented research
tool at the time a patent application is filed. This provides an
efficient mechanism for apprising the patent holder that her
patented research tool has been used.
Self-reporting is
important when infringement is difficult to detect. It is critical
when research tools are not physically incorporated into a
144. See Brief, supra note 12, at 518.
145. See Mueller, supra note 63.
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marketed product or where the results obtained are patented,
but the use is not disclosed in the patent. In these latter cases,
the patent holder would have no effective means to detect the
use. Thus, a self-reporting mechanism would ensure that a
research tool user can be held accountable for that use.
The disclosure requirement is envisioned as an extension
of the patent procurement process. The requirement would
impose a duty on university applicants that is akin to the duty
to disclose information material to patentability that is
required of all applicants by the requirement for good faith and
candor.146 Under the research tool disclosure requirement, a
university applicant would have a duty to disclose patented
research tools necessary to the discovery for which the patent is
sought. A research tool would be necessary when it materially
affects the direction or course of the research conducted. A
research tool would also be necessary when used as a control so
as to give meaning and allow for interpretation of research
results. As is the case with the duty to disclose information
material to patentability, a failure to comply with the research
tool disclosure requirement would render any patent
subsequently issued to the researcher unenforceable.
University researchers who choose not to respect the rights of
other patent holders should be denied the same right.
The duty under the disclosure requirement would not be
contingent on the validity of the research tool patent used in
the research. Compliance with the disclosure requirement
should not be taken as an acknowledgment by the university
patentee that the patent implicated in the research is valid.
The university would be free to refuse to compensate the patent
holder if it deems the research tool patent invalid. The patent
holder, in turn, would still able to seek judicial redress as
would be done under the existing system. This provides a
mechanism by which universities could challenge patents of
questionable validity.
C. PREDETERMINED RESEARCH FEE
The disclosure requirement would be unworkable,
however, without a method for limiting liability once
infringement, in essence, is admitted. Thus, the model also
requires that all patent applicants specify a research license fee
to be applied to university users. The predetermined fee allows
146. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2001).
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the patent holder to name her price while providing prospective
users with notice of the cost of a patented research tool. The
research fee is designated by the patentee when the research
tool patent is issued, although it can be adjusted by the patent
holder during the patent term. The patent holder is free to
raise her price if the technology proves to be robust or lower her
price if demand is low. Changes to the fee will not be applied
retroactively however.
Thus, the research fee is predetermined in the sense that prospective users of patented
research tools are notified of the cost of that tool. This enables
the prospective user to make an informed decision to use a
selected research tool or go without. It also protects the user
from excessive demands from the patent holder after she has
committed to a selected research tool.
Under the current law, the prospective gains from a patent
infringement lawsuit against a university are often too small to
justify the risk of having a patent narrowed or invalidated.147
Thus, most patent holders do not recover for infringing use,
choosing instead to tolerate university infringement.148 This
model allows the patent holder to recover for the use of her
research tools without having to risk an infringement law suit.
Since the patent holder has much to gain, under ordinary
circumstances, one would expect the patent holder to state a
reasonable price to attract the greatest possible use. This will
enhance the value of the research tool and maximize recovery.
A potential pitfall in having the patent holder name her
price is that sometimes the stipulated price would be
prohibitively high. If so, the prospective university user has
several options. First, she can select an alternative tool. If
enough prospective users look elsewhere for alternative
approaches, the value of the research tool patent may drop and
the patent holder would be expected to adjust her price
accordingly – that is, if the patent holder is willing to make her
technology available to others. In this case, the present model
allows the patent holder and ultimately the market to
determine the value of a patented research tool. On the other
hand, if selecting an alternative tool is not possible, the
researcher can refuse to pay the specified fee, in which case the
patent holder is free to bring suit. In essence, the model
provides a “short-cut” for the prospective user to gain
147. Walsh et al., supra note 16.
148. Id.
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unfettered access to patented research tools and for the patent
holder to quickly recover from her investment.
By committing to a research fee, the patent holder has not
forfeited the exclusive right to market the subject of her patent.
For example, the holder of a patent covering a DNA element
designed to isolate operative genes from a pool of genomic DNA
still retains the right to produce and market the DNA element.
The research fee merely notifies the would-be university
researcher of the cost for independently synthesizing and using
that DNA element should she choose to. When the patent
holder elects to produce and market the DNA element, the
DNA element is now available for anonymous purchase and
thus would be outside the ambit of the proposed model.
CONCLUSION
Current patent laws require that university researchers
wanting to avoid the risk of patent infringement liability
engage in ex ante negotiations with patent holders for access to
patented research tools. But the increasing number of patents
on upstream research tools as well as the fragmentation of
rights for a given innovation results in increasing transaction
costs associated with gaining access to research tools. This
article sets out a method for facilitating a university’s access to
patented research tools while enabling patent holders to recoup
their investments in developing these tools. The method
utilizes a research tool disclosure requirement and a
predetermined research fee to facilitate university access to
patented research tools and patent holder’s recovery for that
use.
The disclosure requirement imposes on university
researchers who use patented research tools a duty to disclose
that use at the time of the filing of a patent application. The
disclosure requirement provides notice to patent holders whose
technology has been used in research. The predetermine
research fee is an amount set by the research tool patent holder
at the time the research tool patent is issued. It provides notice
of the cost of a selected technology to would-be users and limits
their liability in exchange for disclosure. The proposed model
alleviates the need to obtain prior consent from patent holders,
while strengthening the value of research tool patents by
providing a means by which patent holders can more efficiently
monitor and recover for the use of the patented research tool.

